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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between international trade and product quality using the EU
policy on Geographical Indications (GIs). Building on the quality sorting model of Crozet et al.
(2012), we add constraints linking product quality to the adoption of the EU policy and different
entry market costs according to the level of competition in the destination market. The main model
predictions are empirically tested exploiting a new dataset collecting country information on GIs
at HS 6-digit level and bilateral trade flows during the period 1996-2014. The main results show
that GIs affect trade differently depending on whether GIs are produced in the exporter or importer
country. In particular, the presence of GIs in the exporter country seems to exert a pro-competitive
effect, while when registered only in the importer country GIs act as an anti-competitive measure.
Keywords: Geographical indicators, EU trade, Extensive-intensive margins, Export prices
JEL classification: F12, F14, Q18
∗Corrisponding author: valentina.raimondi@unimi.it. Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Meth-
ods, University of Milan, Italy.
†chiara.falco@unimi.it. Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, University of Milan, Italy.
‡daniele.curzi@unimi.it. Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, University of Milan, Italy.
§alessandro.olper@unimi.it. Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, University of Milan,
Italy and LICOS, KU Leuven.
1
1 Introduction
Over the last years, the importance attached by consumers to the quality and safety of food products
have been steadily increasing, with a specific attention on the link between health and diet as well as
the diffusion of food products coming from abroad. These facts have increased the consumers demand
for a credible information on the origin of foodstuffs, as well as of their nutritional attributes and the
way they are produced (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996; Grunert, 2005).
In this context, Geographical Indications (hereafter, GIs) have assumed a more valuable impor-
tance in overcoming asymmetric information problems linking the location where a food product is
produced and its traditional quality attributes, a concept that has been summarized by the word terroir
(Josling, 2006). Although they are widespread in different countries in the world, GIs are particularly
important in the European Union (EU).
Besides the importance of GIs for consumers as guarantee of quality, the EU considers GIs an
important economic resource for local producers. Indeed, the production of goods deeply rooted in
the local geography and tradition, represents an important instrument for promoting rural develop-
ment, allowing them to value quality and reputation traditionally linked to local communities and
their production.
Over the last decades, the EU has designed rather elaborate regulations on GIs. At the international
level, GIs are protected by the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), although the protection at this level is lower than in the EU. The
protection under the TRIPS can be circumvented for instance by indicating the true origin of the
product (e.g. Australian Feta), or by translating the original name (e.g. Parmesan Cheese), or by
associating the GI name with an expression indicating the similarity with the EU original product (e.g.
Prosciutto Parma).1
The EU has strongly supported the increasing protection of GIs at the international level, claiming
that the growing number of violations damage both consumers and producers. By contrast, among
non-EU countries, GIs are often considered as property rights that can allow firms’ products to increase
their competitiveness (Josling, 2006). During the WTO trade negotiations these contrasting positions
1See Matthews, A. (2014). Geographical indications (GIs) in the US-EU TTIP negotiations. CAP Reform. EU
(http://capreform.eu/geographical-indications-gis-in-the-us-eu-ttip-negotiations/).
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have been a major point of contention in the last years between EU and non-EU countries. More
recently, these tensions are emerging again in the case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) agreement negotiation between EU and United States.
The lack of any agreement on increased protection of GIs, which instead has been reached in-
stead with Canada within the Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA), is one of the
points of contention that are hindering the positive conclusion of the whole agreement. Therefore, the
protection of GIs is considered as a priority in the EU policy agenda.
As far as we know, few empirical contributions have focused on the role played by GIs in affecting
international trade flows. Sorgho and Larue (2014) take the advantages of a panel data on 27 EU
countries on aggregated flows of agri-food imports in order to investigate the effect of the diffusion
of GIs on the intra-EU trade. Covering three years (1999, 2004 and 2009), and by applying the odds
ratio gravity specification of Head and Mayer (2002), they built an indicator which accounts for the
presence as well as for the number of GIs in each EU country. The main results show that GIs promote
trade only when both the importing and exporting countries are GIs producers.
Focusing on wine export flows, Agostino and Trivieri (2014) study the effect of EU quality policies
through the use of very disaggregated data and by adopting a gravity framework. They found that,
firstly, quality wines produced in specific regions have higher trade values across time and destination
areas than other wines and, secondly, that there exists a positive influence of GIs on the extensive
margin of trade.
Duvaleix-Tre´guer et al. (2015) use French custom firm level data matched with the list of firms
of the French national institute responsible for the official designation, in order to identify those firms
producing PDO cheese products. Their analysis provide evidence that GI certification has an impact
both on the extensive and intensive trade margins and that GIs allow firms to charge higher export unit
values.
Our analysis goes in the same direction of this strand of literature. In particular, we extend the
quality sorting model of Crozet et al. (2012) to the EU quality policy, and we test the model predictions
throughout a careful classification of all the EU GIs products at the HS 6-digit level.
Econometrically we adopt a panel framework through a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) estimator to account for heteroscedasticity and the large proportion of zero in the bilateral
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trade matrix. The analysis considers both the GIs effects on the extensive and the intensive margins
of trade, as well as on export prices. As far as concerned, trade margins decomposition relies on the
theoretical approach of Feenstra (1995) and Feenstra and Kee (2004).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model
which introduces the EU GI policy in a quality sorting model, Section 3 derives the estimable equa-
tions. Section 4 presents data and defines the sample we use for the empirical analysis while Section
5 shows the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Introducing GIs in a quality sorting model
From a theoretical perspective, a study of the potential effects of the diffusion of GIs in shaping the
intra-EU trade can be carried out within a firm-heterogeneity framework. The extensive and growing
literature on this topic suggests that product quality represents a key determinant of firms’ success
in the international markets, as GIs represent a clear quality signal. This strand of literature has
been inspired by the seminal work by Melitz (2003), where heterogeneous firms in a monopolistic
competitive market produce horizontally differentiated goods which can be ranked according to a
parameter, the total factor productivity, that define their export status. According to this model, as an
effect of fixed export costs, more productive firms operate on the export market, while less productive
firms are relegated to operate only domestically or they are driven out from the market. The evolution
of this literature led to the inclusion of product quality in a firm heterogeneity model a la Melitz
(2003), allowing firms to produce vertical differentiated goods. In these so called quality sorting
models, more productive firms perform better in the export markets than less productive firms, as they
produce higher quality products (see Verhoogen (2008); Baldwin and Harrigan (2011); Crozet et al.
(2012); Kugler and Verhoogen (2012)).
Our theoretical model is built on the framework proposed by Crozet et al. (2012), representing one
of the first formalization of a quality sorting model in a firm heterogeneity setting. We depart from
their model firstly, by including additional constraints linking product quality to the adoption of the
EU quality policy, and secondly, by introducing different entry market costs according to the level of
competition in the destination market as a result of the production of GIs.
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2.1 The model
Let’s consider a generic firm F which has the possibility to produce a good j. If it is located in a
specific geographical area α it can have the possibility to adopt a policy γ, which is aimed to promote
the increase of the level of quality s of a good j:
sα,γ|h(j) > s¯α|h(j) > sα|h(j) (1)
with s¯α|h(j) as the average product quality in the area α and sα|h(j) as the general quality level with
h identifying a specific HS product sector. From now-on, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to a
generic level of quality s(j), holding with respect to (1).
As in Crozet et al. (2012)2, the sub-utility function, which is assumed to have a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES), σ > 1, over a set Ωd of goods j, available in country d, is defined as follow:
Ud =
∫
jΩd
(
[ad(j)b[s(j)]q(j)]
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1 (2)
with q(j) as the j good’s quantity. The b(.) function includes quality into quantity equivalents while
ad(j) are country (d) specific demand parameters on j, which account for firm-destination demand
shocks.
In country d consumers are involved to spend an exogenous total amount Xd on j. Hence, the firm
level market share at destination can be defined as the ratio between the export values xd(j) inclusive
of trade costs, and Xd:
xd(j)
Xd
=
[
pd(j)
a(j)b[s(j)]
]1−σ
∫
iΩd
[
pd(i)
a(i)b[s(i)]
]1−σ
di
εd(j) (3)
with pd(.) as product prices and εd(j) being a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm enters market d.
Therefore, firm’s profit maximization can be defined as the difference between revenues and costs,
depending on products quantity, and a specific destination market entry cost (Md):
Πd(j) = [pd(j)− Cdτd]qd(j)−Mdεd(j) (4)
2The theoretical model presented in this section in mainly derived by the Crozet et al. (2012) model. Hence, as far as
possibile, we voluntarily maintain the same notation so that a comparison among models can be easily applied.
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Specifically, we define pd(j) as the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) prices:
pd(j) =
σ
σ − 1Cdτd (5)
depending on marginal costs Cd and on τd which identifies standard iceberg trade costs, with τd > 1
and σσ−1 to be a constant mark-up. Therefore, relation (5) it is the consequence of CES and iceberg
trade cost (i.e. constant markup over marginal costs).
In our framework, marginal costs Cd are increasing in quality (Crozet et al., 2012) and are subject to
two additional constraints:
Cd =

cf [s(j)] if α ∧ γ = 0
cf [s(j)] + αγc[s(j)] if α ∧ γ = 1
(6)
The first case (i.e., cf [s(j)]) holds whenever a firm is not located in a specific geographical area α and
it does not adopt a specific policy on quality γ. In the vein of ?, ? and ?, we include the second case
which describes the situation of firms producing good j in area α and adopting policy γ. Therefore,
the Cd cost term has two components: the first depends on s; the second is subject to the geographical
constraint and is binding to the adoption of a specific quality policy. Following Kugler and Verhoogen
(2012), we assume C ′d > 0 as the production of high quality products requires the use of high-priced
input.
Md is the destination-specific market entry cost defined as:
Mdεd(j) =

mdεd(j) if in d, γ = 0
m∗dεd(j) if in d, γ = 1
(7)
We assume m∗dεd(j) > mdεd(j) so that, for an exporting firm, the entry cost is higher in a destination
market where firms produce product j and comply with the quality policy γ. In this case, the competi-
tion is fiercer than in other markets, where neither firms producing product j comply with the quality
policy γ nor product j is produced. This interpretation has been put forward firstly by Chambolle and
Giraud-He´raud (2005), who argued that certification of origin can act as a non-tariff barrier, assuming
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that only domestic firm can opt for certification. This is often the result of a combination between
quantity restrictions and a kind of quality cost subsidy.3,4
Substituting equation (6) and (7) into (4) and collecting all country-specific determinants of ex-
ports in Ad as the ’attractiveness’ of d (Crozet et al., 2012), the export value can be defined as:
xd(j) =
(
b[s(j)]
Cd
)σ−1
Adηd(j)εd(j) (8)
with ηd(j) being the idiosyncratic demand shifter.
Given equation (8), firm’s profit is positively related to the value of export, while it is negatively related
to the cost of entry in the market d (if and only if εd(j) = 1):
Πd(j) =
xd(j)
σ
−Mdεd(j) (9)
The model provides theoretical predictions on the potential effects of a quality policy, s(j), such
as the EU one, on GIs both with respect to the export and to the import side.
Taking the first derivative of equation (8) it can be show there exists a positive relation between
quality and the export volume ( ∂xd∂s(j) > 0). As GIs represent a clear quality signal, this finding is in
line with the standard predictions of the quality sorting models, where firms exporting higher quality
products have better performance than other firms.
Moreover, plugging equation (8) in (9) the probability to export will be given by:
P[εd(j) = 1] = P([b(sj)]/c[s(j)])σ−1Adαd(j) > σMdεd (10)
so that the probability to export is increasing in the level of quality while is inversely related to firm
costs.
Finally, considering conditions (7) and the assumption that m∗dεd(j) > mdεd(j) we have that the
3In order to obtain a PDO or a PGI certification, producers have firstly to be placed in given territorial limits, and,
secondly, they have to comply with strict rules of production. As a matter of facts, these certifications impose a restriction
in the produced quantity.
4An example could help to clarify this point. Suppose we are considering a product category, e.g. citrus, and an exporting
country, e.g. Italy, which counts one or more GIs on this category. In this case, the cost of entry in a market will be higher
when considering a destination country, e.g. Spain, where GIs citrus are produced, and thus where there already exists
domestic quality competition, than in a market, e.g. Sweden, where 100% of citrus are imported, and thus where there is
not any domestic competition.
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first derivative of equation (9) with respect to entry costs will be negative ( ∂Πd∂Md < 0). This imply that
the diffusion of GIs for a given sector in a given destination country could hinder firm export to that
destination, acting as a non-tariff measure as in Chambolle and Giraud-He´raud (2005) model.
3 Econometric identification and measures
We investigate the relationship between international trade and GIs focusing on intra-EU trade mar-
ket exploiting a panel data analysis. We estimate the theoretical model presented in Section 2 by
decomposing country-product trade data in their extensive and intensive margins. Our strategy is con-
sistent with (Helpman et al., 2007) and Santos Silva et al. (2014) who show how to estimate properly
a firm-level model using such a decomposition of trade data.
We use three different dependent variables: trade/intensive margin, extensive margin, and price
(expressed as f.o.b. price). These variables are derived, respectively, from equation (8), (10), (5).
Our benchmark empirical specification can be written as:
lnXod,ht = β0 +
∑
βnGIht + d,t + o,t + od + ht + εod,ht (11)
with our dependent variable Xod,ht being, alternatively, the volume of trade, the extensive or intensive
margins and the export price, depending on origin o and destination d countries, on the h product
sector and on a time dimension t.5 GIht is the quality explanatory vector (Sorgho and Larue, 2014)
with the βn coefficients of interest varying on n = 1, 2, 3 which identifies the number of GIs in the
exporting (if n = 1, GIo,ht), importing (if n = 2, GId,ht) country or when both countries have GIs
(if n = 3, GIod,ht). d,t, o,t, od and ht are the exporter (importer) time fixed effects, the country-
pair fixed effects, and the year and product-time fixed effects, respectively. The latter account for
any shocks that affect global trade flows in a particular year and in a particular product-time group,
respectively. Finally, εod,ht is the error term.6 By including origin and destination time FE, product
time FE and bilateral FE, the βn coefficients of interest estimate the effects on the dependent variable
5For the sake of simplicity, we have defined in equation (11) the product h as a generic product category. Note that h
will be defined as HS 6 digit product line in the trade and price equation, while as HS 2 digit product line in the intensive
and extensive margin equations.
6As the log of zero is undefined, we utilize the GI variable in level and the estimated coefficients (βn) can be interpreted
as semi-elasticities.
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of a within country/tariff lines increase in the number of GIs, in comparison to the country tariff line
without GIs which represents our benchmark.
There are two possible econometric estimators for relation (11). The main problem is the high
presence of zeros in the bilateral trade flows, which in our specific case is very large due to the high
level of disaggregation of our data. The literature tackled this problem applying either the Heckman
selection correction as in Helpman et al. (2007), or the PPML estimator proposed by Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006). Due to the panel structure of our dataset, we use the PPML estimator. Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006, 2011) showed that this estimator is robust to different patterns of heteroscedas-
ticity and measurement error, and is particularly suitable in the presence of many zeros.
In our case, taking the advantages of a panel data, we use the PPML estimator. Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006, 2011) showed that they estimate trade equation consistently, which is robust to
different patterns of heteroscedasticity and measurement error, and is well behaved in the presence of
many zeros.
Finally, when we estimate equation (11) with the extensive margin, its double bound nature (i.e.,
between 0 and 1), implies that the partial effect of the regressors on the conditional mean of the
dependent variable cannot be constant and must approach zero, as the conditional mean approaches
its bound (Santos Silva et al., 2014). For this reason, they proposed a specific functional form directly
derived from the Helpman et al. (2007) firm heterogeneity model. We estimate extensive margin
equation using this new procedure as robustness check.
4 Data
4.1 GI policy indicator
An important effort of this paper has been dedicated to the GIs classification in accordance with
the Harmonized System (HS) codes at the 6-digit level, which then allowed us to work at a very
disaggregated product level data.
Starting from the European DOOR database (Database of Origin and Registration), which collects
official information on all the registered EU geographical indications, we selected all the Protected
geographical indications (PGI) and Protected designations of origin (PDO) products registered from
9
1996 to 2014.7 Since the DOOR database does not classify products with any official classification,
but it just distinguishes between broad product categories, we matched manually each of the registered
GIs with the corrisponding HS classification codes at the 6-digit level.
Overall, the DOOR dataset includes 1,281 registered GI products, 52.69% IGP and 47.31% PDO.
The classification methodology described above does not allow to find an exact correspondence for
only 51 of these GI products, which have been consequently excluded from the empirical analysis.
The number of GI products registered by the 15 European Countries is 1,036, the 81.26% of total
observations in the DOOR dataset. More than half are PDO products (530). However, as shown in
Figure 1, during the observed period the number of registered PGI products increased more than PDO,
leading to the current equal presence.
The concordance between the GI products of the DOOR database and the Harmonized System
classification is summarized in Table 1 where the number of GIs are aggregated at 2-digit level. As it
is evident from the figures, almost one to four of the GI products are classified in the 04-sector, which
includes mainly cheeses. Among the eighteen 2-digit sectors identified by the classification process,
six sectors, HS 02-04-07-08-15-16, represent the 85.87% of total GIs and, specifically the 92.12% of
total PDO and 79.33% of total PGI. Thus, with the aim of studying the impact of GIs production on
trade, we will study in depth these six sectors, by limiting our empirical analysis to them.
Among the total EU 15 GI products, 25% are from Italy with 33% of Italian PDO in the Dairy
sector while almost 37% of IGP products in Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons.
Slightly less France, representative for more than 20% of EU 15 GIs products mainly driven by the
Dairy sector for PDO, and Meat & edible meat offal sector for PGI (55.9% and 54.39% respectively).
Then Spain, Portugal and Greece; in particular, 45% of the PGI products from Portugal are in the
Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates sector while
39.13% of the Greek PGI products are in the Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers sector
(see Table A.1 in Appendix).
Finally, according to the Broad Economic Categories (BEC), 88% of GIs products can be classified
as final products. Thus, to study the possible pro-competitive or anti-competitive effect of the diffusion
7The distinction between PGI and PDO is related to the extent to which they have to comply with the required origin-
quality link. In the PGI case, it is sufficient that one stage of the product process is carried out in a specific geographical
area, while in the case of PDO all production stages must have to take place in the same defined area.
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of GI products on trade in a country, we choose to focus only on products for final consumption and,
following the BEC classification, we exclude both the GI products and the trade flows of HS 6-digit
products that are classified as intermediate good (see Table A.2 in Appendix).
4.2 Trade data and measures
The overall sample contains HS 6-digit product information on intra-EU 15 bilateral trade flows from
1996, which represents the first year of GIs registration under the EU Regulation system, to 2014. To
avoid potential bias in the estimation results, determined by the progressive enlargements occurred
from 2004 to 2013, and the subsequent abolition of intra-EU tariffs, we maintain constant the sample
of countries involved in the analysis, by focusing only on the EU 15. Indeed, the progressive increase
in the market dimension and the diffusion of GIs in the New Member States could impact and distort
the GIs effect on trade flows. Note that, by focusing only on intra-EU trade we have a key advantage
in comparison to previous analyses. Indeed, due to the EU internal market, firms face neither tariff
nor non-tariff measures (NTMs) when decide to export in a given destination market. This is of
particular importance especially considering NTMs for two reasons. Firstly, because it is difficult
(if not impossible) to build a consistent NTMs database with a time dimension; secondly, as many
NTMs are actually quality and health standards, not controlling properly for them would make the
identification of the GIs trade effect problematic.
Trade data come from the BACI database (Base pour l’Analyse du Commerce International) of
CEPII (Centre d’ Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales), which provides bilateral val-
ues (and quantities) of exports at the HS 6-digit disaggregation level. These data offer the advantage
to correct, with a rigorous procedure, the potential discrepancies between import values, expressed as
CIF, and export values, expressed as FOB (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010). Although this problem is not
severe when we consider trade among European countries, the database improves the quality of the
results when we measure the intensive and extensive trade margins, where, as shown below, exports
from all the world countries is used.
To measure the extensive margin we follow Feenstra and Kee (2004). Let’s Rh2od,t be the exporting
country o’s categories set exported (i.e., with positive trade flows) to the country d, in year t with h2
be the 2-digit level of the HS classification; Rh2dW is the world categories set exported to the country d
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over all the years considered. If V¯ h2dWh6 is the average value of the world’s exports to country o of the
category h6 over the years, then the bilateral extensive margin for industry sector h2 in year t is:
EModh2,t =
Σh6Rh2od,t
V¯ h2dW,h6
Σh6Rh2dW
V¯ h2dW,h6
(12)
If V h2odh6,t is the value of exports of country o to d of the category h6 at time t, the bilateral intensive
margin in industry h2 is:
IModh2,t =
Σh6Rh2od,t
V h2odh6,t
Σh6Rh2od,t
V¯ h2dW,h6
(13)
which compares the export trade values of country o to country d of products in a certain set of goods
in year t with the average export trade values of the world to country d for the same set of products.
Hence, it measures country o’s overall market share within the set of categories it exports to d.
To reduce the large number of zero observations in the data, obtained after squaring the database,
the average value of production for the years 2008–2010 was used. Thus, using FAOStat and EURO-
STAT Prodcom databases for agricultural and food productions respectively, measured at HS 6-digit
level, we dropped out the zero observations when the average production value in the exporter country
was equal to zero. Thus, when a country results to be nor producer nor exporter of the good.8
5 Results
5.1 A first looks to the raw data
Figures 2 reports the average values of the two margins computed as in equation (12) and (13) for the
EU trade, based on the BACI database and limited to the six agro-food sectors mainly involved in the
GIs.
Country-products adopting GIs increase significantly the extensive margin over the whole period,
while the extensive margin of the other countries has declined. Interpreting the data, countries pro-
ducing GI products increase their number of exported varieties, passing from the 30% to close the
50% of the overall varieties imported by the importer countries. By contrast, during the whole period,
both groups of countries have increased their intensive margin, thus the volume of varieties already
8The percentage of zero trade flow at 6-digit level estimation, as in equation (11) is 70%, while at 2-digit level is 18%.
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exported, but with a strongly different pattern. Interestingly, the intensive margin of trade increases
more than three times for exporter countries that produce GIs, while it grows slightly less for the
others.
This preliminary look at the data provides some useful stylized facts. First, GIs country produc-
ers have sharply increased their food export varieties toward the EU in the past 20 years. Second,
EU countries that are non-GIs producer have concentrated their food exports to the EU, in terms of
categories already exported. Third, both groups of countries/industries have increased the intensive
margin, but GIs producer countries show a stronger trend.
These preliminary findings seem to suggest a strong GIs trade effect on both the extensive and
intensive margin. Obviously, these are simple correlations and trends. Next, to properly assess the
role of GI policies in determining these patterns, we move to the econometric analysis.
5.2 Econometric results
In the first step of our empirical analysis we estimate a model exploiting a panel dataset (1996-2014)
using two sets of data structure: one pooled over the main agro-food sectors involved in GIs, and the
other one by considering separately each HS 2-digit sectors. All these estimations use trade data at
6-digit disaggregation level and are estimated with the PPML approach. Specifications always include
fixed effects for importer, exporter, product, and country pair that are not reported in the table.9
Column (1) of Table 2 reports coefficients estimated using equation (11) pooling the data across
all the HS 2-digit considered sectors. First of all, it is worth noting that our key GI coefficients are
all statistically significant at the 99% level. In particular, the results show that when only the importer
country produces GIs, the effect on trade flow is negative and significant. Quantitatively, this results
suggests that the addition of a new GI in the importing country, when the exporter does not produce
any GIs, decreases trade flows of about 3.6%. By contrast, when only the exporter country produces
GI products, the effect on trade flows is positive and significant. In this case, the magnitude of the
estimated coefficient suggests that a new GI produced in the exporting country, when the importing
country does not produce any GIs, increases trade of about 5.4%. Finally, when both countries produce
9Because the model is, de facto, a bilateral gravity equation, bilateral variables such as distance, contiguity and language,
instead of the dyad dummies, could be included in the model. Running the model with these variable included (and so
omitting the dyadic dummies) we obtain similar results that however overstates the coefficients magnitude of our variables
of interest, due to the insignificance effect of these bilateral variable in the context of intra-EU trade.
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GIs, the estimated coefficient is positive and significant, and shows that one additional GI product in
the importing country, when also the exporting country has GI products, increases trade of about 4.3%.
Overall, these results are totally consistent with the predictions coming from our theoretical model.
Indeed, the empirical result confirms that the adoption of a new GI always enhances trade flows when
GIs are produced in the exporting country, while it seems to act as non-tariff measure when GIs exist
only for the importer country. To check for the existence of a trend in the GIs adoption effect, we
introduce an interaction term between GIs variables and year dummies. The results, synthesized on
Figure 3, display different trends. There is a stable and always positive and significant effect on
trade for exporting countries, that shows a slightly decreasing effect when also the importer country
produce GIs.10 By contrast, when GIs are produced only in the importer country, their effect, which
is not always significant but systematically negative, shows higher variability over time and a general
reduction of its anti-competitive effect.
To understand whether the number of GIs registered in the country acts differently within the 6
product groups considered (see Section 4), we estimate equation (11) by product. Results are reported
in Table 2, columns (2) to (7). Even at sectoral level, the trade effect of a new GI in the exporting
countries results to be positive and significant in almost all groups, although the magnitude of the
estimated effect is quite different. The impact of GIs spans from 2-3% of trade increase for Meat
& edible meat offal sector, to 23% and 60% for vegetables and fruits production, respectively. In
these two sectors we do not observe any significant effect on trade when GIs are produced only in
the importer country. A possible explanation for these different patterns is that the latter sectors
include many product lines originating directly from agricultural activity. Thus, requiring specific
factor endowments (natural resources), GIs does not modify the demand of these products on the
importer country. Differently, new GIs in meats and oils sectors, with their negative and significant
coefficients, seem to act as anti-competitive measure for the importer country.
Finally, the Dairy produce; birds’ eggs; natural honey sector, with its 271 GI products, is the only
sector where a new GI in the importer country determines a trade increase from a non-GIs country
(coefficient +0.04). This pro-competitive effect could be explained by a higher demand of products
in the GI producer country, due to an higher level of consumer’s information, or, as suggested by
10To save on space, the estimates on which Figure 3 is based are not reported but are available on request.
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Chambolle and Giraud-He´raud (2005), by a lower quality standard in the new GI that lead to a fiercer
competition. Comparing our results with Sorgho and Larue (2014) is not easy as they measure the
effect of an additional GI product on the border effect, namely the external and internal trade ratio, and
obtaining mixed results. Limiting to results obtained using the PPML estimator, they find a significant
effect only when the importing country has GIs, with a 3% reduction of this ratio, while no effect is
observed on the exporter side of GIs production.
Table 3 reports the estimates of how the impact of GIs over trade can be decomposed into the
extensive and intensive trade margins. The first, reported in column (1), shows the role played by
GIs in opening new trade routes, or increasing the number of the exported varieties. The estimated
coefficients are significant and in line with the effect observed at trade level, except when both coun-
tries have GIs. Thus, a new labelled quality product increases the number of varieties exported, when
the importer does not have GIs. The GIs act as a catalysis to trade and it exerts a pro-competitive
effect. By contrast, when GIs are in the importer country only their presence decreases the number of
imported varieties and GIs act as anti-competitive measure. Finally and interestingly, it does not exert
any effect when both countries produce GIs. These results confirm the positive effect exerted by GIs
in creating new trade route that has been observed by Agostino and Trivieri (2014) for French wines
and by Duvaleix-Tre´guer et al. (2015) for French cheese, although the dimensions of these effect are
not comparable.
The impact of GI on the intensive margin of trade (column 2) maintains the signs and the signifi-
cance observed at trade level (see column (1) of Table 2); thus, it is negative when GIs are only in the
importer country, with reduction of the share of its imports (over its average imports in the period) by
1.4 percentage points, and it is positive when GIs are only in the exporter country, with an increase
of 1.2 points. Finally, the results highlight that when countries are both with GIs their increase in
trade occur only through the increase of what they are already trading (the intensive margin) being the
extensive margin not significant.
To check for robustness of the extensive margin results obtained using PPML estimator, we esti-
mate equation (11) using a more appropriate estimator suggested by Santos Silva et al. (2014). Column
(3) and (4) report and compare the coefficients obtained with PPML and the new SSTW procedure
15
using only the positive extensive margin.11 The estimated coefficients result strongly comparable in
term of sign, dimension and significance, confirming the validity of the PPML estimator.
Finally, to analyze the impact of GIs on exports unit value, the previous estimations have been
performed using the product unit value as dependent variable.12 The preliminary results, reported on
Table 4 and 5, show a similar pattern observed for trade flows. When GIs are produced only by the
importer countries they induced a reduction of the export prices. By contrast, when GIs are produced
by the exporter countries (or both) they induced a significant increase in the export unit values. All
these results corroborate previous findings and are in line with the model predictions.
6 Conclusions
The present study analyzes the relationship between Geographical Indications and international trade
between 15 EU countries. Starting from a simple extension of the quality sorting model of Crozet et al.
(2012) in which we include additional constraints linking product quality to the EU quality policy and
by introducing different entry market costs due to GIs production in the destination market, we derive
three key testable predictions on the trade effect of the EU quality policy.
The econometric analysis confirms the model expectations, by showing that GIs affects trade
differently, depending on who is the GI producer country. The effect on trade flows is positive, and
steady over time, whenever a new GI is introduced by the exporter country, and this happens on both
the intensive and extensive margin. By contrast, the effect observed when GIs are produced only by
the importer country is negative, supporting the idea that GI could act as a non-tariff measure to trade.
Finally, we also find similar relationship between GI and export prices.
Due to this institutionalization of quality protected under the EU regulation, we can state that EU
producers gain on their intra-EU market in term of trade flows. Yet, what is the effect of GIs on extra-
EU international market represents an important and complex question that calls for additional and
future investigation.
11The estimations include only positive value of extensive margin due to the high number of dummies used and the
convergence problem.
12Unit price is obtained by dividing export values and exports volumes reported by BACI database. We removed all
zero value and the severe outliers value. The database strongly decreases the observations number, that move from more to
780,000 to 450,000, but the GIs impacts on trade flows do not change.
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Figures
Figure 1: Distribution of GIs by year of registration
Sources: Authors’ analysis based on DOOR dataset 1996-2014.
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Figure 2: Extensive and Intensive trade margins in GIs producers countries vs non-GIs producers
countries
Sources: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text.
20
Figure 3: Impact on trade of GIs production over the time in the three groups of countries
Sources: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. Notes: All coefficients are significant at 10 per cent levels.
Estimations include importer/exporter-year FE, product-year FE, importer-exporter FE, year FE.
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Table 3: GIs effects on Extensive and Intensive margin: panel estimates
Dependent variable: PPML SSTW
Extensive Intensive Extensive
Margin Margin Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GIs - importer -0.0008** -0.0138*** -0.0027*** -0.001***
(0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0002)
GIs - exporter 0.0027*** 0.0118*** 0.0016*** 0.0016***
(0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002)
GIs - both -0.0001 0.0035*** 0.0003*** 0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Fixed effects:
Importer-year yes yes yes yes
Exporter-year yes yes yes yes
Importer-Exporter yes yes yes yes
Product-year yes yes yes yes
Year yes yes yes yes
No. of obs. 82225 82225 74284 74284
R-Sq 0.62 0.47 0.57 0.65
Sources: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. Notes: Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Column 3 and 4 use only positive Extensive Mar-
gin, and compare PPML and the new SSTW estimation procedure. Column (4)
reports the partial effect, instead of the SSTW estimated coefficients. *, **, ***
indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Constant and
fixed effects not reported.
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Appendix: Tables
Table A.1: Number of GIs products by country of production
Country Total PDO PGI
Italy 263 157 106
France 207 93 114
Spain 172 94 78
Portugal 124 64 60
Greece 94 71 23
Germany 77 9 68
Great Britain 54 23 31
Austria 13 8 5
Netherland 8 5 3
Belgium 7 3 4
Denmark 6 0 6
Ireland 5 1 4
Luxembourg 4 2 2
Sweden 4 1 3
Finland 3 2 1
Source: Authors’ analysis based on
DOOR dataset 1996-2014; EU 15 sam-
ple restriction.
Table A.2: DOOR and BEC classification
Final Intermediate Total
IGP 430 76 506
84.98 15.02 100.00
46.99 62.81 48.84
PDO 485 45 530
91.51 8.49 100.00
53.01 37.19 51.16
Total 915 121 1.036
88.32 11.68 100.00
Source: Authors’ analysis based on
DOOR dataset 1996-2014; EU 15 sample
restriction.
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